This essay uses the mimetic theory of controversial literary anthropologist René Girard to explicate a central but neglected theme in Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged: sacrifice. In Rand's view, big government is supported by a sacrificial ideology founded in the idea of Original Sin that fosters the petty resentments of the masses while scapegoating the productive elite. John Gait triggers the self-destruction of this "infernal" sacrificial machine by withdrawing its intended victims. The resulting political collapse opens the way to a Randian (...) utopia beyond the theorizing of Girard, a society without sacrifice. (shrink)

The series Rethinking Kant bears witness to the richness and vitality of Kantian studies. The series offers an alternative publishing venue of the highest quality, attractive to scholars who want to reach a readership of specialists and non-specialist alike. The collection is unique in its kind, for it garners papers from a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from doctoral students and recent PhDs to well-established thinkers in the field. This is the third volume in the series. It contains papers (...) from three regional study groups of the North American Kant Society, and thus takes the pulse of current Kantian scholarship. (shrink)

Introduction: The role of animals in philosophies of man -- Part I: What's wrong with animal rights? -- The right to remain silent -- Part II: Animal pedagogy -- You are what you eat : Rousseau's cat -- Say the human responded : Herder's sheep -- Part III: Difference worthy of its name -- Hair of the dog : Derrida's and Rousseau's good taste -- Sexual difference, animal difference : Derrida's sexy silkworm -- Part IV: It's our fault -- The (...) beaver's struggle with species-being : De Beauvoir and the praying mantis -- Answering the call of nature : Lacan walking the dog -- Part V: Estranged kinship -- The abyss between humans and animals : Heidegger puts the bee in being -- Strange kinship : Merleau-Ponty's sensuous stickleback -- Stopping the anthropological machine : Agamben's tick-tocking tick -- Psychoanalysis and the science of kinship -- Psychoanalysis as animal by-product : Freud's zoophilia -- Animal abjects, maternal abjects : Kristeva's strays -- Conclusion: Sustainable ethics. (shrink)

In this article, I examine what Kant’s Formula of Universal Law requires of an individual agent in situations of great need, e.g.: if you can easily help a drowning child, or if you know of a famine situation in another country. I first explain why I do not simply apply the standard interpretation of how one can derive concrete duties from Kant’s Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative. I then glean an alternative procedure from Kant’s texts and give the (...) reasons for using that interpretation. Finally, I apply the alternative procedure to situations of great need. – According to the interpretation I glean from Kant’s texts, one (i) should not make an exception to (ii) laws that we believe to be objectively necessary, whereby we derive these rules from (iii) universal ends of humankind. Since we take survival as one of the universal ends of mankind, we deem helping someone whose life is in danger as objectively necessary (to achieve the end). The formal Categorical Imperative demands that one does not make an exception to this rule. Applying this interpretation to cases of great need depends on at least three factors: (i) how urgent the need is, (ii) how great the costs are to the one who helps, and (iii) how many people can help. But at one extreme, where you are the only one who can easily save an innocent person’s life, the Kantian procedure generates a strict duty to help the other in need. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis Sektion 7: Neukantianismus Jean-François Goubet: Paul Natorps Fichte-Rezeption in der »Praktischen Philosophie« von 1925 Geert Edel: Zum Fichte-Bild im Marburger Neukantianismus Frank Witzleben: Fichtes Subjektbegriff im Neukantianismus Sebastian Ullrich: Interpersonalität und Objektivität. Fichtes Spuren in Ernst Cassirers Grundlegung seiner »Philosophie der symbolischen Formen« Sektion 8: Hegelianismus und Spätidealismus Rainer Adolphi: Eine nicht eingestandene Auseinandersetzung. Über das implizite Verhältnis von späterem Fichte und Schelling Liu Zhe: Fichte¿s Practical Self-Consciousness and Hegel¿s Speculation. A Fundamental Dialogue in the Differenz-Schrift (1801) Jürgen Stahl: (...) Junghegelianische ¿Tatphilosophie¿ in ihrem Verhältnis zu Fichte Virginia López-Domínguez: Fichte und der anthropologische Materialismus Ludwig Feuerbachs Sektion 9.1: Phänomenologie: Husserl, Sartre Manuel Jiménez-Redondo: Husserls Begriff der transzendentalen Reduktion aus der Sicht der Philosophie des späten Fichte Jakub Kloc-Konkołowicz : Das Ich und der Andere. Intersubjektivität in der Philosophie Johann Gottlieb Fichtes und in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls Hans Georg von Manz: Die praktische Erfahrung des Anderen und die Funktion der Vergemeinschaftung bei Fichte und Husserl Quentin Landenne: Spekulative Ableitung und/oder phänomenologische Beschreibung der Geschichtlichkeit? Fichtes und Husserls transzendentale Geschichtsphilosophie Vadim Murskiy: Fichte und Husserl als Wissenschaftslehrer und Phänomenologen Cristiana Senigaglia: Intersubjektivität und Freiheit bei Fichte und Sartre Sektion 9.2: Phänomenologie: Heidegger, Jaspers, Levinas Markus Gabriel: Endlichkeit und absolutes Ich ¿ Heideggers Fichtekritik M. Jorge de Carvalho: Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Fichtes drei Grundsätzen der Wissenschaftslehre ¿ die Frage nach der Endlichkeit Christoph Binkelmann: Seinssuche. Fichte ¿ Heidegger ¿ Fichte Helmut Girndt: Georg Simmel und Johann Gottlieb Fichte zu Kants kategorischem Imperativ Ives Radrizzani: Das Selbst, der Andere und die Grenze bei Fichte und Levinas M. A. Pushkareva: J. G. Fichte als Begründer der Phänomenologie Franco Gilli: Fichtesche Anklänge im Denken Karl Jaspers. Versuch einer hermeneutischen Lektüre. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:343 'LIVELY' MEMORY ANP 'PAST' MEMORY At the very beginning of the Treatise Hume distinguishes memory from imagination by noting two different features of ideas of memory not shared by ideas of imagination. The distinguishing marks of memory can be described as (1) memory conceived in terms of the liveliness or vivacity of its ideas and (2) memory conceived in terms of the constraints imposed on the order and (...) form of its ideas by the original impressions from which these ideas have been derived. Both of these conceptions of memory, according to Hume in this initial description, serve to distinguish ideas of memory from ideas of imagination. For purposes of brevity I shall call them, respectively, 'lively' memory and 'past' memory. In this paper I shall be concerned with four main issues arising from Hume's dual characterization of memory. First, I shall call attention to a point whose importance Hume scholars have not, I think, fully appreciated; namely, that later in Book I of the Treatise (Part III, Section V) Hume recognizes that his original dual characterization is not viable because it cannot be fit into his general theory of ideas and that, therefore, one of his two distinguishing features of memory must be abandoned. Second, I shall consider some problems generated by his abandonment of this conception of memory. Third, I shall construct a Humean solution to these problems, based on Hume's revised conception of memory -- a solution that he suggests but never develops. Finally, I shall apply Hume's revised characterization of memory to a central issue in his philosophy, his conception of the self, and show that, although he does not himself use it in his own 344 analysis, this characterization can provide a Humean explanation of our belief in our selves. My line of argument, which will depart not only from that of Hume but also of most of his commentators, is by no means free of difficulties; nevertheless, it has, I think, the virtue of being more consistent with Hume's general theory of ideas, hence is more Humean, than his own. To set the stage for our discussion I shall begin with Hume's initial description of memory and its difference from imagination, as it appears at the beginning of the Treatise. He writes as follows: We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION ___ There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident, namely that tho' neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation (T 89 ) A few comments on this passage are in order. Hume distinguishes memory from imagination on two grounds: (1) the experienced quality of the ideas 345 themselves and (2) the power or the faculty of the mind that produces them. Memory-ideas, as they actually occupy our consciousness, are lively and strong; imagination ideas are faint and languid. Also, memory and imagination, as separate faculties of the mind, differ in their power. Imagination is free to play with its ideas as it pleases; it can arrange and rearrange them at will, to allow us to contemplate "winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants." (T 10) Memory, however, has no such power but must reproduce impressions as memoryideas in the same order and form as they originally appeared in the mind. It requires little explanation to understand why... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:192 HUME'S REFUTATION OF — WOLLASTON? Recently while rereading Book III of Hume's Treatise I was struck by an anomaly in the text that I had never noticed before. It consists in the juxtaposition of two arguments Hume offers regarding the source of the moral qualities of our actions. At first I dismissed Hume's arrangement of these arguments as being of little consequence — one of them appears in (...) a footnote — but the more I thought about the juxtaposition the more it intrigued and puzzled me. Expecting that it must have been noted by other readers I checked through the literature to find some discussion of it. Since after a long search I have failed to uncover anything, and believing the point, which relates to Hume's central view concerning morality, to be of some interest, I have decided to write this brief paper. Two passages from § 1, entitled "Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason," of Part I, Book III, are involved. Hume begins the section by arguing that, because of the limited scope of its capacities, reason cannot distinguish between right and wrong or, as he puts it, between virtue and vice, and therefore that it is a mistake to speak of actions as being reasonable or unreasonable. Since Hume's views on this question are well-known and since they are not directly relevant to the point of my paper, I shall not pursue them further, but turn directly to the issue at hand. After having stated his argument at the beginning of § 1 and reached the conclusion that "actions may be laudable or blameable, but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable," Hume turns to answer an objection that might be made against him by a rationalist ethicist. He writes: 193 But perhaps it may be said, that tho' no will or action can be immediately contradictory to reason, yet we may find such a contradiction in some of the attendants of the action, that is, in its causes or effects (T 459). Pursuing this objection, Hume first considers the causes of our actions. He acknowledges that we can be led astray in what we do in two ways; by making mistakes of fact, first, about the nature of some object we desire (e.g., thinking some fruit delicious when it really is not) and, second, about the means we should employ to gain the object (e.g., attempting to pluck the fruit when it is beyond our reach). Although these errors cause us to act in ways that may be termed unreasonable in a "figurative and improper way of speaking" (T 459), they cannot be the source of any immorality in what we do because they are committed involuntarily and innocently. A person who falls into such errors and acts on them is "more to be lamented than blam'd" (T 459). To conclude his answer to the rationalistic objection he has raised, Hume turns next to the issue of whether the immorality of our actions can be explained in terms of the unreasonableness of any of their effects. In a memorable passage he denies that the fact that false judgments are the effects of our actions can be the source of immorality in what we do. As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions, and which, when false, give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason; we may observe, that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in ourselves, and that 'tis only on others they have such an influence. 'Tis certain, that an action, on many occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a 194 person, who thro' a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood; only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another, but merely to satisfy my lust and passion. It causes, however, a mistake and false judgment by accident; and the falshood... (shrink)

The essay is an exposition and critical analysis of Peter Unger's book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford, 1975). In the introductory chapter my main object, in addition to defining terms, is to distinguish the two forms of scepticism Unger defends in Ignorance, which he calls, respectively, scepticism about knowledge and scepticism about rationality. Chapter II is devoted to an exposition, analysis, and evaluation of the latter and Chapter III of the former. In Chapter IV I consider a second-order argument (...) that informs Unger's case throughout the book, his "ancestor language" hypothesis. In the final chapter I assess his scepticism as a whole and attempt to develop some of its implications concerning both the possibility and actuality of knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:205 TIME AND THE IDEA OF TIME Hume entitled Part II of Book I of the Treatise "Of the Ideas of Space and Time." Students of this most obscure Part of the Book are aware, however, that he spends little time in it on time. The main reason for his concentration on space. is polemical. In Part II his primary object is to exhibit the contradictions and absurdities implicit (...) in the science of his day with its postulation of empty space and of the mathematics with its notion of infinite divisibility, and then to show how these difficulties can be overcome by the adoption and implementation of the theory of ideas he had developed in Part I. As a result, with the exception of a discussion that occupies approximately three pages in Section III, most of his references to time in Part II are little more than brief appendages tacked on to his arguments concerning space. Hume commentators have generally taken their cue from him. Although the literature contains substantial analyses of his views about space, very little can be found on the subject of time. In this paper, I shall attempt to add something to that slim literature. As its title indicates, this paper will be concerned with two subjects, time and the idea of time. Hume accepts the ordinary distinction between thé two. Time and our idea of time are separate realities, the former being a part of the world independent of us and the latter being a part of the content of our consciousness. I shall observe this distinction, beginning with an account of what Hume means by time and following that with an explanation of his theory of the origin and nature of the idea of time. After finishing these two expository sections I shall devote 206 the remainder of the paper to a critical examination of Hume's views on both subjects, ending with a suggestion about a possible alternative route he might have followed in his argument about time and the idea of time in Part II. A final preliminary point: Although Hume devotes most of his attention to space in Part II, he makes it clear that, because space and time (as well as our ideas of them) are analogous to each other in certain vital respects, his views concerning the former can easily be transferred and applied to the latter. 1. Time Hume states or implies several things about the nature of time in Part II. (1)He equates time with duration, treating the two terms as equivalent throughout his discussion. (2)Time is an objective reality, or aspect of the external world. This interpretation may be questioned because Hume never asserts an objectivistic view of time unequivocally and in certain passages writes in a way that could be interpreted as implying that time is a characteristic of our conscious experience. "As 'tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time..." (T 35). But later he writes: "...time is nothing but the manner, in which some real objects exist..." (T 64). Also, in the titles of his first two sections he makes a clear distinction, labelling Section I "Of the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time" and Section II "Of the infinite divisibility of space and time." Since, in Section II, it is apparent that he is talking about space as a part 207 of the external world, the natural inference is that he is talking about time in the same way, as, for example, when he writes, "The infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is evident from the nature of motion" (T 31). (3)Time is not infinitely divisible but is made up of parts Hume calls 'moments' (T 31). These moments are the 'building blocks' of time and are ultimate and indivisible. They are analogous to the ultimate, indivisible parts of space, which Hume labels 'mathematical points' (T 40). (4)The moments of time are not co-existent but successive. In this respect time differs from space. "'Tis also evident, that these parts [of... (shrink)

The Commentary on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides an in-depth article-by-article analysis of all of the Vienna Convention's provisions. Each provision's analysis consists of (I) Purpose and Function of the Article, (II) Historical Background with Negotiating History, (III) Elements of the Article and finally (IV) Treaties of International Organizations. In short, the present Commentary contains a comprehensive legal analysis of all aspects of the international law of treaties. Furthermore, where the law of treaties reaches into other (...) fields of international law, e.g. the law of state responsibility, the relevant interfaces are discussed and contextualized. With its focus on international practice, the Commentary is an invaluable reference for both academia and practitioners of international law. (shrink)

The following four theses all have some intuitive appeal: (I) There are valid norms. (II) A norm is valid only if justified by a valid norm. (III) Justification, on the class of norms, has an irreflexive proper ancestral. (IV) There is no infinite sequence of valid norms each of which is justified by its successor. However, at least one must be false, for (I)--(III) together entail the denial of (IV). There is thus a conflict between intuition and logical possibility. This (...) paper, after distinguishing various conceptions of a norm, of validity and of justification, argues for the following position. (I) is true. (II) is false for legislative justification and true for epistemic justification. (III) is true for legislative and false for epistemic justification. (IV) is true for legislative justification; for epistemic justification (IV) is true or false depending on the conception taken of a norm. Our intuition in favour of (II) must therefore be abandoned where justification is conceived legislatively. Our intuition in favour of (III) must be abandoned, and our intuition in favour of (IV) qualified, where justification is conceived epistemically. (shrink)

Respect is one of the central concepts in contemporary moral thought. It plays a prominent role in everyday, pre-philosophical moral thinking, as well as in recent moral theory and applied ethics. Yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect have received less attention than might be expected. This volume takes up some of these basic questions. The book is not meant to be a comprehensive handbook that covers all aspects of the topic of respect, nor is the focus (...) of the book mainly historical. Rather, the aim is to give leading experts in the field a chance to present their latest ideas and point the research on respect in new directions. Following an introductory historical essay, Part I addresses questions of what respect is, its nature and basis. Part II examines questions in moral theory, for example what exactly ought to be respected, what role respect plays in morality, and which different types of respect are appropriate and morally significant. Part III deals with the practical application of requirements of respect. The essays in this volume will be of interest both to scholars and students working on issues of respect and to anyone interested in this central moral notion. (shrink)

This book explores the constitutional, legally binding dimension to legisprudence in the light of the German Federal Constitutional Court's approach to rational lawmaking. Over the last decades this court has been remarkably active in applying legisprudential criteria and standards when reviewing parliamentary laws. It has thus supplied observers with a unique material to analyse the lawmakers' duty to legislate rationally, and to assess the virtues and drawbacks of this strand of judicial control in a constitutional democracy. By bringing together legislation (...) experts and public law scholars to elaborate on 'legisprudence under review', this contributed volume aspires to shed light on the constitutionalisation of rational lawmaking as a controversial trend gaining ground in both national and international jurisdictions. The book is divided into five parts. Part I frames the two key issues pervading the whole collection: the intricate relationship between judicial review and democracy, on the one hand, and the possibility of improving and rationalizing the task of legislation under the current circumstances of politics, on the other. Part II provides an overview of the judicial review of rational lawmaking, laying special emphasis on the duty of legislative justification imposed on lawmakers by the German Constitutional Court. Part III is devoted to the review of the systemic rationality of legislation, in particular to the requirements of legislative consistence and coherence as developed by this court. Contributions in Part IV revolve around the judicial scrutiny of the socio-empirical elements of rational lawmaking, with the control of legislative facts and impacts and the problem of symbolic laws being the central topics. Finally, Part V draws on the German case law to discuss the links between rational lawmaking, balancing and proportionality, and the interdependence between process review and substantive review of legislation. (shrink)

The object of Theological Ethics as presented by Hans Ulrich is immediately the content of the experience of God; reflectively it is God himself turned towards us; doubly reflected on, it is the inversion of our understanding of the good or conversion. The concept of an object may be traced to the discussion of the sciences from Schleiermacher to Barth. Three questions are put to it: (i) Does it assimilate the study too much to descriptive reason, as opposed to practical (...) reason? (ii) Does it narrow the study's range of interests so as to exclude the created world? (iii) Does it result in an idealised `creaturely man', wholly determined by his end and dissociated from the empirical man who may confront us as a neighbour? (shrink)

This chapter considers a further appeal to history that can be made within the cumulative case for Christianity, namely the appeal to a providential reading of universal history as making, despite all evidence to the contrary, most sense of the way in which world history is moving. There are, in the so-called Christian centuries, and even in the secularised post-Christian world, signs of the admittedly partial penetration of society by the Christian Gospel’s ‘Kingdom values’ of justice, freedom, peace, and truth, (...) and — some would argue — of democracy. In support of this view, the work of Hendrikus Berkhof and Oliver O’Donovan is cited and contrasted with that of Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Huntington. (shrink)

This volume reflects on questions of human rights in the context of globalization. The essays responding to this subject are rich and varied: they focus on legal acceptance as well as consequences of human rights with regard to social rights and the necessary protection of the environment connected or close to those rights. Another approach to the subject featured in the volume is the legal recognition and the consideration of human rights as moral rights. With concepts on universality, a new (...) cosmopolitism, cultural pluralism and perspectives on religious variants and technological advances the debate on human rights is concluded. Index / Indice I. The Foundation of Rights / El fundamento de los derechos: J. Rubio Carracedo: El legalismo occidental: un problema para la universalizacion de los derechos humanos J. A. Seoane: El caracter juridico de las leyes injustas M. Borowski: Classifying and qualifying properties of fundamental rights J. von Platz: Faith in reason: questioning practical reason as fact, norm, end, and function of human rights R. Cruft: Policy implications of the philosophical foundations of human rights Maria Gabriela Scataglini: Derechos humanos: otra mirada sobre la cuestion de su universalidad II. A New Cosmopolitism / Un nuevo cosmopolitismo: V. de P. Barreto: Derecho cosmopolita y derechos humanos Luis Fernando Barzotto: Reconocimiento y fraternidad A. R. Bernstein: Justifying universal human rights via Rawlsian public reason H. Khatchadourian: Democracy and the globalization of human rights Milagros Otero Parga: Derechos humanos y globalizacion Halim Bepari: Human rights and the United Nations Miracy B. S. Gustin: Rescate de los derechos humanos en situaciones adversas de paises perifericos III. Multiculturism and Pluralism of Values /Multiculturalidad y pluralismo de valores: M. Herrero / M. Saralegui: Dogmatismo politico y pluralismo religioso Berry Tholen: Migration, justice, and Europe's identity. The relevance of special ties for EU's migration policy C. M. Alvarez Chicano: Implicaciones de la inconmensurabilidad de los valores en la aplicacion de principios de orden etico y juridico L. Perez Conejo: Axiologia juridica y pluralismo de valores: algunas consideraciones sobre la nocion de 'inconmensurabilidad' S-I. Liu: Fundamental legal values and globalization with regard to historical experience in freedom of speech L. C. Amezua: Libertad natural y esclavitud voluntaria: reflexiones de F. Suarez sobre la esclavitud IV. Rights and Gender / Derechos y genero: J.M. Gil Ruiz: La violencia de genero en el contexto familiar y la agresion de la ciencia juridica A. Goiriena Lekue: El interes superior del/la nino/a, coparentalidad y neutralidad de genero en la atribucion de la guarda y custodia de los hijos e hijas P. Garcia Guevara: Las politicas de genero en los paises globalizados del 'Tercer Mundo' V. Technological Impact and New Generation Rights / Impacto tecnologico y nuevas generaciones de derechos: M. Ahteensuu: Understanding the precautionary principle in the light of the traditional weak-strong distinction: a critical comment Cristina Monero Atienza: Bases para una teoria de los derechos en el siglo XXI M. Kitahara: Personal data processing and business ethics: personal data processing and personal data protection in business A. D. Oliver Lalana: El lado empirico de la legitimidad comunicativa: sobre la publicidad organizativa del derecho de proteccion de datos en internet J. Ebbesson / M. Zamboni: Transbordering democracy? The case of environment protection Sagrario Moles Nieto: El impacto medioambiental de los cultivos transgenicos VI. Bioethics and Law / Bioetica y derecho: M. Cruz Diaz de Teran: Principios para una biojuridica global C. Faralli / S. Tugnoli: Bioethics between law and science: the Italian law on medically assisted procreation (Law No. 40, February 19, 2004) N. Zeegers: The working of power in communicative regulation: the case of research with human embryos J. A. Fernandez Suarez: La bioetica en la era de la globalizacion F. J. Blazqez Ruiz: Privacidad y discriminacion genetica: propuestas bioeticas y juridicas ante los desafios de un mundo globalizado. (shrink)

Die Bibliotheca Teubneriana, gegründet 1849, ist die weltweit älteste, traditionsreichste und umfangreichste Editionsreihe griechischer und lateinischer Literatur von der Antike bis zur Neuzeit. Pro Jahr erscheinen 4-5 neue Editionen. Sämtliche Ausgaben werden durch eine lateinische oder englische Praefatio ergänzt. Die wissenschaftliche Betreuung der Reihe obliegt einem Team anerkannter Philologen: Gian Biagio Conte (Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa) Marcus Deufert (Universität Leipzig) James Diggle (University of Cambridge) Donald J. Mastronarde (University of California, Berkeley) Franco Montanari (Università di Genova) Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (Georg-August-Universität (...) Göttingen) Oliver Primavesi (Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München) Michael D. Reeve (University of Cambridge) Richard J. Tarrant (Harvard University) Vergriffene Titel werden als Print-on-Demand-Nachdrucke wieder verfügbar gemacht. Zudem werden alle Neuerscheinungen der Bibliotheca Teubneriana parallel zur gedruckten Ausgabe auch als eBook angeboten. Die älteren Bände werden sukzessive ebenfalls als eBook bereitgestellt. Falls Sie einen vergriffenen Titel bestellen möchten, der noch nicht als Print-on-Demand angeboten wird, schreiben Sie uns an: [email protected] Sämtliche in der Bibliotheca Teubneriana erschienenen Editionen lateinischer Texte sind in der Datenbank BTL Online elektronisch verfügbar. (shrink)

This article addresses the apparent tension in O’Donovan’s overall argument in The Ways of Judgment (2005): a tension between his constructive account of judgement (central to Parts I and II), and his endorsement of Jesus’ injunction not to judge (central to Part III). After clarifying exactly what kind of judgement O’Donovan intends in identifying judgement as the core political practice, the article highlights a few key aspects of O’Donovan’s political theology that might mitigate, or even take away, the tension in (...) his argument. The article then goes on to address a remaining issue, namely that O’Donovan seems to imply that Christians are to judge only in private, thereby leaving all public judgement to the secular authorities. In response to this impression the article will affirm, in the light of Rom. 12:1-8, that the church does exercise public judgement, by corporately discerning, formulating and enacting the implications of God’s judgement in Christ. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to make two main points. The first point is methodological: Instead of attempting to give a classical analysis or reductive definition of the term “expertise”, we should attempt an explication and look for what may be called symptoms of expertise. What this comes to will be explained in due course. My second point is substantial: I want to recommend understanding as an important symptom of expertise. In order to give this suggestion content, I begin to (...) develop an account of understanding. Finally, I will draw attention to some consequences of this approach. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper a relational account of incongruent counterparts is defended against an argument due to Kant. I then consider a more recent attack on such an account, due to John Earman, which alleges that the relationalist cannot account for the lawlike left--right asymmetry manifested in parity-violating phenomena. I review Hoefer's, Huggett's and Saunders' responses to Earman's argument and argue that, while a relationalist account of parity-violating laws is possible, it comes at the cost of non-locality.

In a companion paper (Pooley & Brown 2001) it is argued that Julian Barbour's Machian approach to dynamics provides a genuinely relational interpretation of Newtonian dynamics and that it is more explanatory than the conventional, substantival interpretation. In this paper the extension of the approach to relativistic physics is considered. General relativity, it turns out, can be reinterpreted as a perfectly Machian theory. However, there are difficulties with viewing the Machian interpretation as more fundamental than the conventional, spacetime interpretation. Moreover, (...) this state of affairs provides little solace for the relationist for, even when interpreted along Machian lines, general relativity is a substantival theory although the basic entity is space, not spacetime. (shrink)

Der Artikel spürt den subtilen Veränderungen nach, die bei Patienten, die mit tiefer Hirnstimulation behandelt werden, möglicherweise beobachtet werden können. Dabei sollen im Rückgriff auf Konzeptionen zur narrativen Identität mittels einer möglichst genauen Beschreibung und Analyse der Selbstwahrnehmung der Patienten sowie der Wahrnehmung ihres Umfelds die Änderungen im praktischen Selbstverhältnis untersucht werden, u. a. am Beispiel technomorpher Metaphern, die von den Patienten in ihren Selbstbeschreibungen verwendet werden. Ziel ist es, die Neuartigkeit und das Spezifische der Neurotechnologien – über die bisherigen (...) Untersuchungen hinaus – hinsichtlich des Umgangs mit sich selbst herauszuarbeiten und greifbar zu machen. Abschließend werden auf Basis der Analyse der Patienten-Narrationen die entsprechenden normativen Implikationen für eine ethische Bewertung des Einsatzes von Neurotechnologien benannt. (shrink)

Deepfakes are fake recordings generated by machine learning algorithms. Various philosophical explanations have been proposed to account for their epistemic harmfulness. In this paper, I argue that deepfakes are epistemically harmful because they undermine trust in recording technology. As a result, we are no longer entitled to our default doxastic attitude of believing that P on the basis of a recording that supports the truth of P. Distrust engendered by deepfakes changes the epistemic status of recordings to resemble that of (...) handmade images. Their credibility, like that of testimony, depends partly on the credibility of the source. I consider some proposed technical solutions from a philosophical perspective to show the practical relevance of these suggestions. (shrink)

Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and (...) philosophical analysis of what prompted Kant to develop his conception of autonomy, charting the historical background which prompted his search, and thoroughly analysing different stages of his writings in order to see which element of autonomy was introduced at which point. The resulting volume will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kantian moral philosophy, as well as to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy. (shrink)

Mein Beitrag behandelt zentrale Probleme der Methodologie der Textinterpretation im Lichte der neueren Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Nach Vorbemerkungen zum Begriff der Interpretation wende ich mich den Methoden der Bildung und kritischen Prüfung von Interpretationshypothesen zu. Wie ist das Verhältnis von Daten und Hypothesen im Falle der Textinterpretation? Wie können Interpretationshypothesen epistemisch gerechtfertigt bzw. gestützt werden? Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen untersuche ich die Anwendung der Hypothetisch-Deduktiven Methode und der Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung auf die Textinterpretation. Der Vergleich zeigt, (...) dass die Methode des Schlusses auf die beste Erklärung vorzuziehen ist. (shrink)

The implications for the substantivalist–relationalist controversy of Barbour and Bertotti's successful implementation of a Machian approach to dynamics are investigated. It is argued that in the context of Newtonian mechanics, the Machian framework provides a genuinely relational interpretation of dynamics and that it is more explanatory than the conventional, substantival interpretation. In a companion paper (Pooley [2002a]), the viability of the Machian framework as an interpretation of relativistic physics is explored. 1 Introduction 2 Newton versus Leibniz 3 Absolute space versus (...) an affine connection 4 Anti-relationalist arguments 5 Rehabilitating relationalism 6 Dynamics on the relative configuration space 7 Intrinsic particle dynamics 8 Conclusion. (shrink)

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By (...) framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own. (shrink)

Cet article propose une interprétation de la relation entre l’aletheia et la doxa dans le poème de Parménide sur la base d’une analyse du voyage relaté dans le proème. À partir d’un examen précis du texte parménidien, il établit que l’hypothèse selon laquelle la citadelle de la nuit est la destination finale du voyage rend bien mieux compte de celui‑ci que l’hypothèse longtemps admise selon laquelle il s’agirait de la lumière. Cette lecture du proème permet non seulement d’établir un certain (...) nombre de parallèles avec d’autres œuvres poétiques qui décrivent le trajet du Soleil, mais surtout de mettre au jour une analogie entre le récit de voyage et la partition en deux du poème parménidien : notre monde, où alternent le jour et la nuit, représente le monde de la doxa, où être et non-être sont mêlés et qui est gouverné par deux principes correspondants, le feu et la nuit, tandis que l’unicité de la déesse de la Nuit dans l’au‑delà renvoie à celle de l’être. De plus, en distinguant deux étapes dans le voyage du narrateur, celle où il atteint de lui‑même le chemin de la nuit et du jour et celle où les filles d’Hélios le guident sur ce chemin, on peut expliquer l’existence même d’un discours sur les opinions des mortels : de même que le narrateur a besoin d’abord d’aller de notre monde quotidien jusqu’au chemin de la nuit et du jour pour avoir ensuite accès à la connaissance divine, de même il faut expliquer le monde de l’opinion en le faisant remonter à deux principes fondamentaux pour montrer aux mortels le chemin vers l’aletheia. L’article conclut en expliquant, à partir des fragments B14 et B15, pourquoi Parménide a recours à la déesse de la Nuit pour faire cette révélation : ce choix repose sur une critique de la lumière du soleil comme condition de la vision trompeuse. (shrink)

Dummctt argues that classical quantification is illegitimate when the domain is given as the objects which fall under an indefinitely extensible concept, since in such cases the objects are not the required definite totality. The chief problem in understanding this complex argument is the crucial but unexplained phrase 'definite totality' and the associated claim that it follows from the intuitive notion of set that the objects over which a classical quantifier ranges form a set. 'Definite totality' is best understood as (...) disguised plural talk like Cantor's 'consistent multiplicity', although this does not help in understanding how a totality could be anything other than definite. Moreover, contrary to his claims, Dummett's own notion of set is not intuitive and he does not demystify the set-theoretic paradoxes. In conclusion, it is argued that Dummett's context principle is responsible for the incoherent projection of the haziness of a conception of some objects onto reality. (shrink)

A dual-code model of number processing needs to take into account the difference between a number symbol and its meaning. The transition of automatic non-abstract number representations into intentional abstract representations could be conceptualized as a translation of perceptual asemantic representations of numerals into semantic representations of the associated magnitude information. The controversy about the nature of number representations should be thus related to theories on embodied grounding of symbols.